SPENDING AREA · NATIONAL DEFENSE
FY2025 National Defense net outlays · 13.08% of all federal outlays. October 2024–September 2025. Final, completed fiscal year actuals; Treasury reporting through October 17, 2025, with later revisions possible.
Function 050 is the accounting boundary, not a department or contractor total. It includes military activities, defense-related nuclear activities and other defense activities. F-35 examples below sit within this wider spending area; do not add their costs to this total. Appropriations authorize funding, obligations commit it, and outlays record spending. They are different measures.
The ledger covers people and capability: military personnel, operations and maintenance, equipment procurement, research and development, construction and family housing. These uses are visible in Treasury’s military-program accounts. They are a description of support, not a second breakdown to add together. Intended benefits include national security and operational capability; the total alone cannot establish how effectively those goals were met.
Evidence: [1] · [2]
Congress sets defense policy through authorization laws and provides spending authority through appropriations and other enacted laws. House and Senate Appropriations Committees develop funding legislation; authorization is distinct from appropriation. The president submits a budget proposal and signs or vetoes legislation. Defense agencies and military departments implement enacted funding; program offices manage particular acquisitions. Payments in FY2025 can reflect obligations made in earlier years.
Evidence: [1] · [3]
One enacted FY2025 funding decision: H.R. 1968 passed the House 217–213 on March 11, 2025, and the Senate 54–46 on March 14. The president signed it on March 15 as Public Law 119-4. Division A continued appropriations through September 30, with Department of Defense provisions in Title IV. This law is one part of the funding history—not an explanation of every dollar in FY2025 outlays. Earlier appropriations and obligations also matter. Evidence: [7]–[10].
Military personnel and civilian staff are paid for work; contractors are paid for equipment, supplies and services. Payment recipients and intended beneficiaries are different roles. In the F-35 example, the Joint Program Office manages contracts with Lockheed Martin for the air vehicle and Pratt & Whitney for propulsion. The Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps operate the aircraft. A comprehensive FY2025 recipient ranking has not yet been established here; no contract ceiling or obligation total is presented as cash paid.
Evidence: [1] · [5]
A documented payment example, outside FY2025: GAO reports that JPO paid Lockheed Martin more than $3 million in supply-related incentive fees under the 2024 air-vehicle sustainment contract. This is an incentive payment, not the total contract value or a FY2025 recipient total. GAO also found weaknesses in payment documentation for the 2021–2023 contract. Evidence: [5], incentive-fee section and note 50.
GAO’s June 2025 assessment found that initial capability delivery for major defense acquisition programs was expected to take nearly 12 years on average. This is a selected-program finding, not a measure of all defense spending. For a concrete outcome, follow F-35 readiness: GAO reported that the fleet’s FY2025 mission-capable rate was 44%, while its full mission-capable rate was 25%. Those operational measures do not quantify civilian wellbeing or the overall value of defense. A sourced account from personnel or affected communities remains an evidence gap.
Evidence: [4] · [5]
GAO recommends earlier use of iterative development and better contract incentives. It records an implemented step: the Air Force updated acquisition-review guidance in July 2025, with similar changes for Space Force briefings. Guidance changes do not prove improved outcomes. A different policy choice is CBO’s December 2024 illustration of a smaller defense budget: it estimates $959B less in outlays over 2025–2034 relative to defense plans, with choices about force size and reliance on allies. This is a projection and policy option, not FY2025 actual spending or a CBO endorsement. GAO’s acquisition team and the Joint Program Office are identifiable institutions working on reform; no advocate’s personal testimony is invented.
Evidence: [4] · [6]
Sources & reading notes
Research checked October 6, 2026. Each finding retains its own observation period. Recommendations and projected savings are distinct from actual outlays and demonstrated outcomes.